§22.2Elite extraction (AR-Verdier)
Elite Extraction16 eq
(22.1) ★
★ Elite preferences
Elite Preferences
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t\, C^i(t)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ elite preferences (linear).
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ elite preferences (linear).
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ elite preferences (linear).
(22.2)
Production Y_i
Production Y_i
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$Y_i(t) = F(K_i(t), L_i(t))$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur i 생산.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur i 생산.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur i 생산.
(22.3)
Labor constraint
Labor Constraint
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\int_{S_m} L_i(t)\, di \leq 1$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ labor 제약.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ labor 제약.
(22.4)
First-best k*
First-best k*
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$k_i(t) = k^* \equiv (f')^{-1}(\beta^{-1} + \delta - 1)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ first-best modified golden rule.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ first-best modified golden rule.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ first-best modified golden rule.
(22.5)
Labor allocation
Labor Allocation
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$L_i(t) = L^* \equiv \min\!\left\{\bar L,\ \frac{1}{\theta_m}\right\}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ symmetric labor.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ symmetric labor.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ symmetric labor.
(22.6)
Capacity condition
Capacity Condition
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\theta_m\, \bar L > 1$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ capacity 조건.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ capacity 조건.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ capacity 조건.
(22.7)
Wage = MP_L
Wage = MP_L
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$w(t) = w^* \equiv f(k^*) - k^*\, f'(k^*)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ first-best wage.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ first-best wage.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ first-best wage.
(22.8) ★
★ ★ Tax-transfer constraint
★ ★ Tax-Transfer Constraint
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$T_w(t) + \theta_m\, T_m(t) + \theta_e\, T_e(t) \leq \tau(t)\, \int_{S_m} F(K_i, L_i)\, di$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ government budget.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ government budget.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ government budget.
(22.9)
★ Equilibrium definition
Equilibrium Definition
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\{[K_i(s+1), L_i(s)]_{i \in S_m}\}_s\ \text{taking } p_t \text{ as given}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ equilibrium 정의.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ equilibrium 정의.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ equilibrium 정의.
(22.10) ★
★ ★ Distorted Euler
★ ★ Distorted Euler
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\beta\, [(1-\tau(t+1))\, f'(k_i(t+1)) + (1-\delta)] = 1$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ tax-distorted Euler.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ tax-distorted Euler.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ tax-distorted Euler.
(22.11)
★ Distorted k(τ)
★ Distorted k(τ)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\hat k(\tau) \equiv (f')^{-1}\!\left(\frac{\beta^{-1} + \delta - 1}{1 - \tau}\right)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ tax-induced K.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ tax-induced K.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ ★ tax-induced K.
(22.12) ★
★ k'(τ) < 0
k'(τ) < 0
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\hat k'(\tau) = \frac{f'(\hat k)}{(1-\tau)\, f''(\hat k)} < 0$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ tax 늘면 K 줄어든다.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ tax 늘면 K 줄어든다.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ tax 늘면 K 줄어든다.
(22.13)
Distorted wage
Distorted Wage
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\hat w(\tau(t)) = (1-\tau(t))\, [f(\hat k(\tau)) - \hat k(\tau)\, f'(\hat k(\tau))]$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ tax 후 임금.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ tax 후 임금.
(22.14)
★ Elite transfer
Elite Transfer
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$T^e(t) = \frac{1}{\theta_e}\, \tau(t)\, \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ elite 가 자신의 share 만큼 받는다.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ elite 가 자신의 share 만큼 받는다.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ elite 가 자신의 share 만큼 받는다.
(22.15) ★
★ ★ Elite Bellman
★ ★ Elite Bellman
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$V^e(\tau(t), [K_i]) = \max_{\tau(t+1) \in [0,1]} \{T^e(t) + \beta\, V^e(\tau(t+1), \cdots)\}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ elite 동적계획.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ elite 동적계획.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ elite 동적계획.
(22.16) ★
★ Optimal tau hat
Optimal τ-hat
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$f(\hat k(\hat \tau)) + \frac{\hat \tau}{1 - \hat \tau}\, \frac{[f'(\hat k(\hat \tau))]^2}{f''(\hat k(\hat \tau))} = 0$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ elite optimal tax FOC.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ elite optimal tax FOC.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ elite optimal tax FOC.
§22.3Cobb-Douglas closed forms
Cobb-Douglas Closed Forms6 eq
(22.17) ★
★ Cobb-Douglas
Cobb-Douglas
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$Y_i(t) = \frac{1}{\alpha}\, K_i(t)^{\alpha}\, [A_i(t)\, L_i(t)]^{1-\alpha}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ Cobb-Douglas + entrepreneur productivity A_i.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ Cobb-Douglas + entrepreneur productivity A_i.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ Cobb-Douglas + entrepreneur productivity A_i.
(22.18)
Per capita CD
Per Capita CD
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$f(k_i) = \frac{1}{\alpha}\, (A_m)^{1-\alpha}\, k_i^{\alpha}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — per-capita.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — per-capita.
(22.19)
Tax with entry
Tax with Entry
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$T_w + \theta_m\, T_m + \theta_e\, T_e \leq \varphi\, \int_{S_m \cup S_e} \tau_i(t)\, F(K_i, L_i)\, di$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ tax with entrepreneur entry.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ tax with entrepreneur entry.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ tax with entrepreneur entry.
(22.20) ★
★ k(τ) closed-form (CD)
★ k(τ) Closed-Form (CD)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$k_i(t+1) = \hat k_i(\tau(t+1)) = (\beta(1-\tau(t+1)))^{1/(1-\alpha)}\, A_i$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ Cobb-Douglas 의 closed-form.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ Cobb-Douglas 의 closed-form.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ Cobb-Douglas 의 closed-form.
(22.21)
★ Net marginal product
Net Marginal Product
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$(1-\alpha)\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, (1-\tau)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, A$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur 의 마진.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur 의 마진.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ entrepreneur 의 마진.
(22.22) ★
★ ★ Wage equilibrium (Prop 22.3)
★ ★ Wage Equilibrium
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$w(t) = \min\!\left\{\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, (1-\tau_e)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, A_e,\ \cdots\right\}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ wage from competition.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ wage from competition.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ wage from competition.
§22.4Distributional conflict + competition
Distributional Conflict + Competition12 eq
(22.23) ★
★ τ_RE definition
τ_RE Definition
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\tau_m(t) = \tau_{RE} \equiv \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ revenue-extracting tax.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ revenue-extracting tax.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ revenue-extracting tax.
(22.24)
Elite max τ_m problem
Elite Max τ_m Problem
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\max_{\tau_m(t)} \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, A_e - w(t) \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ elite 의 distortion choice.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ elite 의 distortion choice.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ elite 의 distortion choice.
(22.25)
Constraint Le, Lm
Constraint Le, Lm
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\theta_e\, L_e(t) + \theta_m\, L_m(t) = 1$$
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — 노동 분배.
(22.26)
★ Lm condition
Lm Condition
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$L_m(t) = \bar L\ \text{if } (1-\tau_m)^{1/(1-\alpha)}\, A_m \geq A_e$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ middle class 진입 조건.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ middle class 진입 조건.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ middle class 진입 조건.
(22.27)
Prop 22.6 conditions
Prop 22.6 Conditions
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$A_e \geq \varphi\, \alpha^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, A_m\, \frac{\theta_m}{\theta_e}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ A_e 충분히 높으면.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ A_e 충분히 높으면.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ A_e 충분히 높으면.
(22.28) ★
★ ★ τ_COM
★ ★ τ_COM
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\tau_m(t) = \tau_{COM} \equiv \frac{\kappa(\bar L, \theta_e, \alpha, \varphi)}{1 + \kappa}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ competition tax.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ competition tax.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ competition tax.
(22.29)
★ κ definition
κ Definition
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\kappa(\bar L, \theta_e, \alpha, \varphi) \equiv \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\, [1 + \theta_e\, \bar L]$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ κ closed.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ κ closed.
(22.30)
★ η endogenous (entry)
η Endogenous (Entry)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\eta(t) = \eta(\theta_m\, C_m(t)) \in [0, 1]$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ entry probability.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ entry probability.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ entry probability.
(22.31)
Tax revenue equation
Tax Revenue Equation
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\varphi\, (1-\beta)(1-\alpha)\, \alpha^{-(1-2\alpha)/(1-\alpha)}\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ revenue.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ revenue.
(22.32)
Tax revenue alt
Tax Revenue Alt
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\varphi\, \alpha^{-(1-2\alpha)/(1-\alpha)}\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — alt revenue.
3세 비유
DRAFT — alt revenue.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — alt revenue.
(22.33)
★ A_m FOC
A_m FOC
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\Gamma'(A_m) = \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha\, (1-\beta)}\, \beta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, (1-\tau_{RE})^{1/(1-\alpha)} \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ middle-class technology FOC.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ middle-class technology FOC.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ middle-class technology FOC.
(22.34)
A_m envelope
A_m Envelope
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$A_m - \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\, \frac{\tau_m}{1-\tau_m}\, A_m + \tau_m\, \frac{dA_m}{d\tau_m} = 0$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ A_m envelope.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ A_m envelope.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ A_m envelope.
§22.5Probabilistic voting
Probabilistic Voting6 eq
(22.36)
Welfare function J
Welfare Function J
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$J\ \text{be the social welfare function}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — welfare J.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — welfare J.
(22.37)
★ Voter sigma
Voter Sigma
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\tilde \sigma^g_i(A) = 0\ \text{normalization}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ voter ideology.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ voter ideology.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ voter ideology.
(22.38) ★
★ Voting probability
Voting Probability
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$v^g_i(p_A, p_B) = \begin{cases} 1 & U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B) > \tilde \sigma^g_i \\ 1/2 & = \\ 0 & \text{else} \end{cases}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ probabilistic voting.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ probabilistic voting.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ probabilistic voting.
(22.39) ★
★ ★ Vote share π_A
★ ★ Vote Share π_A
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\pi_A = \sum_g \lambda_g\, H^g(U^g(p_A) - U^g(p_B))$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ aggregate vote share.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ aggregate vote share.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ aggregate vote share.
(22.40) ★
★ Equilibrium FOC
Equilibrium FOC
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\sum_g \lambda_g\, h^g(0)\, DU^g(p^*) = 0$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ probabilistic voting equilibrium.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ probabilistic voting equilibrium.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ probabilistic voting equilibrium.
(22.41)
★ Pareto weights
Pareto Weights
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\sum_g \chi^g\, \lambda_g\, U^g(p)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ implicit Pareto weights.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ implicit Pareto weights.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ implicit Pareto weights.
§22.6Heterogeneous + median voter
Heterogeneous + Median Voter5 eq
(22.42) ★
★ Heterogeneous Bellman
Heterogeneous Bellman
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$V_i(k_i \mid p_t) = \max_{k_i' \geq 0} \{(1-\tau(t))\, A_i\, f(k_i) - A_i\, k_i' + T(t+1) + \beta\, V_i(k_i' \mid p_{t+1})\}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ heterogeneous Bellman.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ heterogeneous Bellman.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ heterogeneous Bellman.
(22.43)
★ Distorted Euler
Distorted Euler
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\beta(1-\tau(t+1))\, f'(k_i(t+1)) = 1$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ same as 22.10.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ same as 22.10.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ same as 22.10.
(22.44)
k(τ)
k(τ)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\hat k(\tau) = (f')^{-1}((\beta(1-\tau))^{-1})$$
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — k(τ).
(22.45)
★ Tax revenue T(t+1)
Tax Revenue T(t+1)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$T(t+1) = \int_0^1 \tau(t+1)\, A_i\, f(\hat k(\tau(t+1)))\, di = \tau(t+1)\, \bar A\, f(\hat k(\tau(t+1)))$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax revenue.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax revenue.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu & James Robinson (2006) | Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy | DRAFT — political economy of institutions. |
| Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2001) | The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development (AER) | DRAFT — institutions instrumental approach. |
| Acemoglu, Robinson, Verdier (2004) | Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule | DRAFT — elite predation model. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax revenue.
(22.47) ★
★ ★ Single-crossing
★ ★ Single-Crossing
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\tau' \in [0, 1]\ \text{satisfy single-crossing condition} \Rightarrow \text{median voter决定}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ Prop 22.17 — median voter.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ Prop 22.17 — median voter.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Persson & Tabellini (2000) | Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy | DRAFT — probabilistic voting model. |
| Anthony Downs (1957) | An Economic Theory of Democracy | DRAFT — median voter theorem origin. |
| Allan Meltzer & Scott Richard (1981) | A Rational Theory of the Size of Government | DRAFT — Meltzer-Richard 정전. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ Prop 22.17 — median voter.
§22.7Acemoglu 2008 — Oligarchic + endogenous tech
Acemoglu 2008 Oligarchic + Endogenous Tech13 eq
(22.48) ★
★ Endogenous tech Y_i
Endogenous Tech Y_i
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$Y_i(t) = \frac{1}{\alpha}\, K_i(t)^{\alpha}\, (A(t)\, L_i(t))^{1-\alpha}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ Acemoglu 2008 setup.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ Acemoglu 2008 setup.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ Acemoglu 2008 setup.
(22.49)
Tax revenue
Tax Revenue
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\text{Tax}(t) = \tau(t)\, \int_0^1 Y_i(t)\, di$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ aggregate tax.
(22.50)
★ Innovation A(t)
Innovation A(t)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$A(t) = \alpha\, \zeta^{1-\alpha}\, G(t)^{1/\zeta}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ G(t) 가 R&D 누적.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ G(t) 가 R&D 누적.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ G(t) 가 R&D 누적.
(22.51)
★ Sticky tax
Sticky Tax
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\tau(t) = \bar \tau\quad \forall t$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ 정전 dictatorship 가정.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ 정전 dictatorship 가정.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ 정전 dictatorship 가정.
(22.52)
★ k_i closed
k_i Closed
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$k_i(t) = (\beta(1-\bar \tau))^{1/(1-\alpha)}\, A(t)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ closed k.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ closed k.
(22.53)
★ Tax revenue function
Tax Revenue Function
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$T(A(t)) = (\beta(1-\bar \tau))^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, \bar \tau\, A(t)^{\alpha}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ T(A) closed.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ T(A) closed.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ T(A) closed.
(22.54) ★
★ ★ Elite Bellman (V^e)
Elite Bellman (V^e)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$V^e(A(t)) = \max_{A(t+1)} T(A(t)) - \frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha\, \zeta}\, A(t+1)^{\zeta} + \beta\, V^e(A(t+1))$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ elite tech investment.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ elite tech investment.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ elite tech investment.
(22.55)
FOC (V^e)
FOC (V^e)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\frac{1-\alpha}{\alpha}\, A(t+1)^{\zeta - 1} = \beta\, (V^e)'(A(t+1))$$
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ FOC.
(22.56)
Envelope
Envelope
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$(V^e)'(A(t+1)) = T'(A(t)) = (\beta(1-\bar \tau))^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, \bar \tau\, \alpha\, A(t)^{\alpha-1}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ envelope.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ envelope.
(22.57) ★
★ A(t+1) closed
A(t+1) Closed
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$A(t+1) = A[\bar \tau] \equiv \beta^{1/(1-\alpha)}\, (1-\alpha)^{-1}\, \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ A 진화 closed.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ A 진화 closed.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ A 진화 closed.
(22.58)
★ V^e(A) closed
V^e(A) Closed
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$V^e(A(t)) = (\beta(1-\bar \tau))^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, \bar \tau\, A(t)^{\alpha} + \beta^{1/(1-\alpha)}\, \cdots$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ V^e closed.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ V^e closed.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ V^e closed.
(22.59) ★
★ ★ Y(τ-bar)
★ ★ Y(τ-bar)
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$Y(t) = Y[\bar \tau] \equiv \frac{1}{\alpha}\, (\beta(1-\bar \tau))^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}\, A^{\alpha}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ output as function of τ.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ output as function of τ.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ output as function of τ.
(22.60) ★
★ ★ τ* optimal extraction
★ ★ τ* Optimal Extraction
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\bar \tau^* = \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha + \alpha\, \zeta}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ Acemoglu 2008 의 정전 — elite 의 optimal extraction rate.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ ★ ★ Acemoglu 2008 의 정전 — elite 의 optimal extract
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ canonical bridge — ★ ★ ★ Acemoglu 2008 의 정전 — elite 의 optimal extraction rate.
§22.8Closing
Closing4 eq
(22.61)
★ Closing argument
Closing Argument
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$g = 0\ \text{(elite prefers no growth)}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ closing — elite vs growth.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ closing — elite vs growth.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ closing — elite vs growth.
(22.62)
★ Log Bellman
Log Bellman
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$V^e(k) = \max_{\tau \in [0,1]} \log(\tau\, A\, k^{\alpha}) + \beta\, V^e(\alpha\, \beta(1-\tau)\, A\, k^{\alpha})$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ log version Bellman.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ log version Bellman.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ log version Bellman.
(22.63)
★ FOC log
FOC Log
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$\frac{1}{\tau} = \beta^2\, \alpha\, A\, k^{\alpha}\, (V^e)'(k') = \frac{\beta\, k'\, (V^e)'(k')}{1-\tau}$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ FOC log version.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ FOC log version.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ FOC log version.
(22.64)
G(t) capital identity
G(t) Capital Identity
DRAFT
vc-passed
$$G(t) = \tau(t)\, \bar K(t)$$
Intuition
DRAFT — ★ G = τ × K-bar.
3세 비유
DRAFT — ★ G = τ × K-bar.
Genealogy
| 인물 | 저작 | note |
|---|
| Daron Acemoglu (2008) | Oligarchic versus Democratic Societies (J European Econ Assoc) | DRAFT — endogenous tech with elite/median voter. |
| Daron Acemoglu (2010) | When Does Labor Scarcity Encourage Innovation? (JPE) | DRAFT — directed tech change + institutions. |
Applications
- Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson 2001 colonial origins
- Acemoglu-Robinson 2006 dictatorship democracy
- Acemoglu 2008 oligarchic vs democratic
- Persson-Tabellini 2000 political economics
- Meltzer-Richard 1981 size of government
Civilizational Relevance
DRAFT — ★ G = τ × K-bar.